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O. Introduction 
Recently economists have been exploring ways to introduce money into applied general 
equilibrium analyses. Virtually all these efforts have followed the quantity theory tra­
dition of Irving Fisher and Alfred Marshall. This tradition focuses on the transactions 
role of money. To model this role of money, most of these studies have used the Lucas 
and Stokey (1983, 1987) cash-credit good extension of the Lucas (1982) and Svensson 
(1985) cash-in-advance model. Examples of such studies are Cooley and Hansen (1989), 
Altig and Carlstrom (1991) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1993), amongst others. 
The behavior of real returns on government debt in these representative household 
economies is grossly at variance with the data. In these model economies, the average 
real return on government debt is close to 5 percent while in the V.S, the average rate 
of return on 3 month T-bills was only 0.6 percent during the 1950-1986 period. Further, 
in these model economies the expected real interest rate varies little, and this result 
is essentially independent of the monetary policy rule followed. However, in the V.S. 
the average real interest rate on government debt over periods as long as 5 years has 
varied significantly: In the 1974-78 period it averaged -1.6 percent, while in 1981-85 
it averaged 4.7. These disparities present a very serious problem for the representative 
household approach, if it is to be used in evaluating the implications of short-term 
monetary policy. 
These large disparities between the model predictions for real interest rate behavior 
and U.5. data have lead us to abandon the representative household abstraction for 
monetary po~icy analysis and to introduce household heterogeneity. In this exploratory 
study households are heterogeneous with respect to their nominal asset holdings and 
their production opportunities. In the permanent income tradition of Bewley (1980), 
these households vary their holdings of nominal assets in order to buffer their flows of 
consumption against uninsured idiosyncratic variations in the market value of their time 
endowment.1 
lOther analyses of economies with uninsured idiosyncratic uncertainty are Lucas (1980) and 
imrohoroglu (1989, 1991). 
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Any model economy that explores the behavior of real returns on interest bearing 
government debt must include at least two government issued assets: one that bears 
interest and another one that does not. If both of these assets are to be held in equi­
librium the non-interest bearing asset must play some role which the interest bearing 
asset cannot play. The exact nature of this role does not seem to be all that important 
for the issues that we are addressing here.2 In this study we follow Bryant and Wallace 
(1979) and we assume that interest-bearing government debt, which we call T-Bills, is 
issued only in large denominations. On the other hand, the denomination of the non 
interest-bearing asset, which we call currency, is small. 
Given that our economy has heterogeneous households, its state at each point in 
time must specify the distribution of households as indexed by their asset holdings and by 
their production opportunities. When there is only idiosyncratic household uncertainty 
and no aggregate uncertainty, for policies that result in a constant inflation rate and a 
constant nominal interest rate, the equilibrium path of this distribution of households 
converges to a steady state distribution. We find that steady state distributions exist for 
policies with .both low -zero- and high -three percent- real returns to T-bills. The 
zero percent return is significantly smaller than the infinitely lived household's subjective 
time discount rate, which together with the average growth rate of consumption ties 
down the average real interest rate in the neoclassical growth mode1.3 
\Ve also compute the equilibrium process for a special class of government policy 
rules that allow for random changes in both nominal and real interest rates. We find 
that policy rules with persistent changes in the real interest rate have significant effects 
on output and employment. Further, these effects increase over time and they take a 
few years to be fully realized. On the other hand, policy rules with transitory changes 
in the real interest rate have effects on output and employment that are negligible. 
21\1arimon and Wallace (1987) assume that breaking up the large denomination T-bills is costly. 
Another way to model this additional role for the non-interest bearing asset is to introduce a bank­
ing system and to impose a legal requirement that banks must hold non interest-bearing reserves on 
deposits. Yet another way is to follow Lucas (1982) and to include a cash-in-advance constraint. 
3Real rates of return have to be adjusted for inflation risk, but quantitatively, these adjustments are 
small. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 1 we formally describe 
our class of monetary economies, we define the equilibrium processes, and we discuss 
calibration issues. In Section 2, we describe the computational experiments and we 
report our findings. Finally, in Section 3 we present our concluding comments and we 
provide some suggestions for future research. 
1. Description of the Class of Monetary Economies 
1.1 Information 
There is an exogenous economy-wide stochastic process {ztl. This process is a Markov 
chain and its transition probabilities are: 
7rz (Z' I z) =Pr{zt+l = z' I Zt = z}. (1) 
for z, z' E Z = {I, 2, ... , nz }. We assume that the Markov chain generating z is such 
that it has a single ergodic set, no transient states and no cyclically moving subsets. 
Each household also faces an idiosyncratic random disturbance, s, that affects its 
individual production possibilities. Conditional on the realization of the economy-wide 
shock one period ahead, these idiosyncratic disturbances are assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed across households. The process for this household-specific 
production shocks, {sd, is also assumed to follow a finite-state Markov chain with 
conditional transition probabilities given by: 
7rs (S' I s,z') =Pr{st+l = s' I St = S,Zt+l = z'}. (2) 
where s, s' E S = {I, 2, ... ns } and z' E Z. 
The joint processes on (s, z) are therefore Markov chains with n = n, X n z states. 
Their transition probabilities are: 
7r[(S',z') I (s,z)] = 7rs (s' I s,z')7rz (z' I z) (3) 
Households know the laws of motion of both {stl and {zd. At the beginning of each 
period they observe the realizations of both stochastic processes. Trade ensues. 
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1.2 The government sector 
The government in this economy taxes labor income at a rate fJ. This is a proportional 
tax and is restricted to being a function of the current value of the economy-wide shock, 
Zt, only. The tax rate at date t is fJ(Zt). The government also issues two assets. The 
first asset determines the unit of account and bears no interest. We denote it by M, 
and we call it currency. The second asset is a large denomination risk-free promise to 
deliver, units of currency at the beginning of the period immediately after its date of 
issue. This asset may sell at a discount. We denote it by B, and we call it a T-bill.4 
Variable Pt is the price of one unit of the date t composite good. Government policy 
determines the pricing process on currency, e(zt) = Pt/Pt-b and the discounted price of 
government debt, e(zd = q(Zt)., where q(zd denotes the price of a sure claim to one unit 
of currency one period ahead. 5 To implement these policies, the government exchanges 
goods and currency at a price Pt and sells and buys promises to deliver, units of nominal 
value next period at price ,q(Zt). We only consider economies with a positive nominal 
interest rate ·policy, that is, where q(z) ::; 1 for all Z E Z. An additional restriction 
is that q(z)c(z') < 1//3 for all z and z'. With this restriction the real rate of return 
on interest-bearing government debt is always less than the households' subjective time 
discount rate. Finally, we make the additional assumption that households may not 
pool their savings and share the proceeds of T-bills. 
A government policy rule is, therefore, a specification of {fJ(z), e(z), e(z)} and 
the associated processes on public consumption, g, on the government supply of T­
bills, Bg, and on the government supply of currency, Mg. Under this specification for 
the government policy, the nominal version of the government budget constraint is the 
following: 
(4) 
4Note that throughout this paper we follow the convention that capital letters denote nominal quanti­
ties and, except where otherwise indicated, lowercase letters denote the real values of the corresponding 
variables in terms of current-period prices. 
5Note that the pricing policies are also restricted to being a function of the current value of the 
economy-wide shock, Zt, only. 
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where Yt denotes the aggregate output of period t. 
1.3 The household sector 
Preferences 
We assume that at each point in time the economy is inhabited by a large number, 
actually a measure one continuum, of households. These households order their random 
streams of consumption and leisure according to: 
00 
E 2:J3t.u(Ct, T - nt) (5) 
t=O 
where u is a continuous and strictly concave utility function, (3 is the time-discount 
factor, Ct is the perishable household consumption good which is restricted to being 
non-negative, T is the household endowment of productive time and nt is time allocated 
to market activities. Hence, T - nt is time allocated by the household to non-market 
activities which we call leisure. 
Productive opportunities
 
The household's date t production of the composite good is:
 
w(s,z)nt (6) 
where w(s, z) is that household's technology parameter. When households choose to 
work, they are paid their marginal product. Therefore w(s, z) equals the household's real 
wage. Following Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), we assume a labor indivisibility. 
Labor services, nt, are constrained to belonging to the set {a, I} where zero corresponds 
to not being employed and one corresponds to being employed. 
Monetary Arrangements 
Households can hold integer amounts of small denomination currency M E {a, 1,2, ...}. 
They can also hold integer numbers of large denomination T-bills B E {a, 1, ... , nb}' 
The denomination of T-bills in terms of currency is a large integer "/" Since there are 
no insurance technologies available, agents hold these assets for consumption smoothing 
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and for protection against variations in their marginal productivities and therefore in 
their labor income. 
The households' decision problem 
Let Mt+l denote the nominal end-of-period household currency holdings, Bt, the nominal 
end-of-period household holdings ofT- bills, and At = Mt+'}'Bt, the beginning-of-period 
nominal asset holdings. Then, the nominal version of the household competitive decision 
problem is the following: 
(7) 
subject to the budget constraint 
(8) 
The maximization is also subject to M t+1 and Bt+1 belonging, respectively, to sets M 
and Band n; belonging to {O, I}. Finally, Mo and Bo are taken as given. 
Let m = Mt+dpt denote household real holdings of currency, b = Bt+dpt, house­
hold real holdings of T-Bills, and a = mt-l +'}'bt-b household real holdings of beginning­
of-period assets, all three valued in terms of the current period's consumption good. 
Then, the functional equation for the dynamic program solved by an (a, s)-type house­
hold is the following: 
v(a,s,z) = b~~~n{U(C'T-n)+,B~v(a',s"Z')7l'8(S' I s,z')7l'z(z' IZ)} (9) 
8 ,z 
subject to the budget constraint 
c +m +"Iq(z)b =5 a/e(z) +nw(s, z)(1 - 0) (10) 
and to n E {O, I}, c ~ 0, m E {O, p, 2p, ... ,'}'}6 where p denotes the real value of one 
unit of currency, and bE {O, 1, ... , nb} and where a' = "Ib +m. Given that the agent's 
problem is a finite state discounted dynamic program, an optimal stationary Markov 
6Note that he nominal interest rate on T-bills is always positive for the policies that we consider. 
As a result, T-bills dominate currency in rate of return. Therefore, it is never optimal to hold more 
than l' units of m and the restriction that m $ "Y is never binding. This constraint is imposed, none 
the less, so that the problem becomes a finite dynamic program. 
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plan always exists. This optimal plan and the stochastic processes on (s, z) define an 
equilibrium state transition probability matrix on A x S x Z. The ergodicity of this 
matrix is established in Appendix 2. 
1.4 Definition of equilibrium 
In the goods and asset market the government is not a small agent so treating it as just 
another price-taking agent is not reasonable. Instead, part of the specification of the 
economy must be the policy arrangement employed and the resulting government excess 
demand correspondences for the consumption good and for both assets. Features of our 
explicit arrangement include the properties of the assets issued by the government, the 
liquidity constraints and the legal restrictions. Other features of our policy arrangement 
are that that the government taxes labor income at a rate lJ(z)j that each date the 
government exchanges goods for currency at price Pt j that this price satisfies Pt+! = 
PtC:(Zt); that it exchanges T-bills for currency at a price of q(Zt) per unit of currency to 
be delivered the following period, and that this price satisfies q(Zt) = U(Zt). For such 
an arrangement there is a well defined government excess-demand correspondence. We 
now define a recursive equilibrium. 
The state of a household is the triple (a, s, z). The measure of agents of type (a, s) 
is x(a,s). 'Ye let x denote the corresponding measure. The economy-wide state is the 
pair (x, z). 
An equilibrium for a policy arrangement {lJ(z), e(z), U(z)}, given Xo, consists of 
four basic parts: a government policy {g(x,z), m9 (x,z), b9(x,z)}, a household policy 
{c(a,s,z), n(a,s,z), m(a,s,z), b(a,s,z)}, pricing processes {e(z), q(z)}, and a law of 
motion for the measures of agent types, X~,,8' = fa',8'(X, z, z'), such that: 
i.)	 Given the processes on, lJ(z), e(z) =pt/Pt-ll and q(z), the household policy solves 
the household's optimization program described in equations. (9)-(10) above. 
ii.)	 The goods market clears: 
Lx(a,s)[c(a,s,z) - n(a,s,z)w(s,z)(I-lJ)] +g(x,z) =0 (11 ) 
a,s 
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for all (x, z) in the support of the distribution of (Xt, Zt) for some t. 
iii.)	 The currency market clears: 
m9 (x,z) =Lx(a,s)m(a,s,z)	 (12) 
a,s 
iv.)	 The T-bills market clears: 
b9(x,z) = Lx(a,s)b(a,s,z)	 (13) 
a,s 
v.)	 Household and aggregate behavior are consistent: 
fa',s'(x, z, z') = L x(a, s )71" [(s', z') I (s, z)]	 (14) 
a,sEO(a',z) 
for all (a',s',x,z,z'), where O(a',z) = ((a,s): a' = m(a,s,z) +,b(a,s,z)}. Note 
that fa's' == x'(a',s') for all (a',s') E A x S. 
vi.)	 The behavior of endogenous variables is consistent with the policy arrangement. 
For our class of policy arrangements, this requires that e(z) = e(z), q(z) = e(z) 
and g(y,z);::: 0 for all (x,z) in the support of the distribution of (Xt,Zt) for some 
For the set of policy arrangements that we consider, there is at most one equilibrium. 
The computa.tional procedure we use to find the equilibrium is the following: first we 
solve the household problem which is a finite-state discounted dynamic program. Then 
we use the household optimal decision rules and the initial distribution of households 
to obtain a s~ochastic realization of g(x,z) from (11). If gt = g(Xt,Zt) turns out to be 
a positive stochastic process, we have found the unique equilibrium given the policy 
arrangement. Otherwise, we have established that no equilibrium exists for that policy 
arrangement. A fully documented version of the FORTRAN program used to solve this 
economy is available from the first author upon request. 
7Note that the households' budget constraints and the market clearing conditions imply that the 
government budget constraint is also satisfied. In real terms an expression for the government budget 
constraint is the following: 9t =(JYt +m9 - m~ 1/ e + "y( qb9 - b~ 1/ e) 
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1.5 Calibration 
The transitions on the economy-wide process and the parameters that specify the govern­
ment policy are different for different experiments and we discuss them in the following 
section. The remaining calibration choices are the following: 
Time period. 
Most V.S. time series are reported quarterly. Wages, however, are paid more frequently. 
Our model period, therefore, should be shorter than a quarter of a year. We chose the 
model period to be an eighth of a year. This choice enables us to have some temporal 
aggregation while keeping the computation costs within reasonable bounds.8 
The exogenous individual-specific process 
In the three model economies considered, we assume that the individual-specific pro­
ductivity process, {s}, can take two possible values, s E S = {I, 2}. State 1 represents 
high productivity draws and state 2 represents low productivity draws, e.g. a qualified 
electrician who can only find a job a a janitor. 
The transition probabilities are chosen so that, on average, 92 percent of the time 
on average, agents experience the high productivity shock and the remaining 8 percent of 
the time they experience the low productivity shock. We also require that the expected 
duration of the low productivity shock be of two model periods, or a quarter of a 
year. These values roughly match the average V.S. employment rate and the expected 
duration of unemployment in V.S. business cycles. Given that in this paper we are not 
specifically concerned with shocks to the aggregate technology, in Experiment 3 we also 
assume that the individual productivity processes are independent of z. The transition 
probabilities on s that satisfy these requirements are the following:9 
8During the calibration stage of this project we experimented with shorter model periods and we 
found that they did not result in significant changes in the aggregate properties of the model. 
9These transition probabilities for the individual-specific processes are the same as those considered 
in imrohoroglu (1989). 
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Sf = 1 Sf = 2 
s=l 0.9565 0.0435 
s=2 0.5000 0.5000 
Preferences 
Following the applied general equilibrium tradition we choose a utility function with 
constant elasticity of substitution in consumption and leisure. During the last 50 years, 
in the V.S., per capita leisure has remained virtually constant, per capita consumption 
has grown at an average rate of nearly 2 percent and real wages have increased by a 
factor of two. To match these observations we assume a unit elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure. The utility function for our model economies is, 
therefore, the following: 
(15) 
where T - n is leisure. 
\Ve select preference parameters 13 = 0.995 and Q = 0.33. These parameter values 
imply an annual subjective time discount rate of 4 percent and a share of leisure of 
approximately two-thirds. These values for the time discount rate and for the share 
of leisure are in line with observations from national income and product accounts on 
the net real rate of return on capital and on the average fraction of productive time 
that households allocate to the market. We choose (1 = 1.5. This value is commonly 
used in applied general equilibrium exercises in public finance and business cycle the­
ory. Our choice of T reflects the fact that the average workweek including commuting 
time is roughly 45 hours or approximately 45 percent of people's weekly endowment of 
productive time, given that we consider the productive part of a day to be 14 hours. 
Parameter T is, therefore, 1/0.45 = 2.22. 
Technology parameters 
The model economy technology parameters are denoted w(s, z). The values of those 
parameters are normalized so that the productivity of highly productive types is 1.0. 
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The relative size of the marginal productivities of households in their high and low 
productivity times is three. This number is chosen to roughly match the ratio between 
the average hourly wage in V.S. manufacturing and the minimum hourly wage in the 
U.5. With these choices we are implicitly assuming that there are always minimum 
wage openings for anyone who wants them. Finally in Experiment 3 the technology 
parameters are chosen to be independent of z. This additional restriction facilitates 
the comparison between Experiments 1 and 2 and the long-run asymptotic behavior of 
Experiment 3 when there are no policy switches. These parameter choices, together 
with the denomination of T-bills and the transition probability parameters, result in 
average holdings of both assets that are reasonably close to V.S. aggregates. ID 
The resulting productivity parameters for each type of agent are the following: 
s=1 s=2 
w(s) 1.00 0.33 
Units and bounds 
In addition to the parameters already discussed, in order for the program described in 
equations (9) and (l0) to be well defined, we must choose the real value of one unit of 
currency, p, the denomination T-Bills, " and the maximum number of T-Bills, nb. 
In every experiment we choose p = 1/100 and, = 300. These choices imply that 
the real value of one T-bill is 3, which approximately corresponds to 50 percent of the 
average yearly model economy per capita income and roughly matches the value of the 
ratio of the denomination of T-bills to per capita yearly income in the V.S. The choice 
for p implies that the real value of one unit of currency corresponds to approximately 
lONote, however, that there is one dimension in which our calibrated economy fails to mimic the 
data: in Experiment 3 the percentage variations in household annual incomes are nearly twice as large 
as those found in panel studies of the U.S. economy. The reason for this divergence is that in the 
model economies, households hold liquid assets only as a substitute for insurance against idiosyncratic 
income variations. It goes without saying that people hold liquid assets for many other reasons. Liquid 
assets are held, for instance, as a substitute for insurance against sickness and accidents, or to make 
large payments for consumer durables, college education, and down-payments on houses. Given that 
our model economies abstract from these reasons, greater income variability is needed if the average 
aggregate asset holdings are to come close to those observed in the data. This property of Experiment 3 
could be changed by allowing the productivity parameters to vary with z. This modification, however 
would cloud the comparisons with the two other experiments. 
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0.148 percent of the model economy average per capita yearly income. If we take V.S. 
average per capita yearly income to be $20,000, the smallest currency unit of the model 
economies would be worth, approximately, $30. We find this unit to be sufficiently 
small for the purposes of this paper. Making this unit smaller raises computational 
costs significantly and has virtually no effect on the aggregate properties of the model. 
Finally, the maximum number of T-bills that a household can hold is nb =3. We find 
that this value is never binding in equilibrium. 
2. The Experiments 
In the U. S. in the 1926-80 period real returns to short-term interest bearing government 
debt averaged about zero percent. This low real interest rate regime changed during 
the 80's when interest rates increased to about 3 percent. Throughout the 1926-90 
period inflation rates averaged about 4 percent. In this paper we explore the behavior 
of the model economy under real interest regimes that mimic this behavior: a low real 
interest rate regime defined by a nominal interest rate of 4%, an inflation rate of 4% 
and, consequently a zero real return to interest-bearing debt, and a high real interest 
rate regime with a nominal interest rate of 7%, an inflation rate of 4% and, consequently 
a 3% real return to interest-bearing debt. These policy choices are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: The Real Return Regimes 
Policy parameters ~ Low Real Returns I High Real Returns ~ 
Nominal interest rate 7% 4% 
Inflation 4% 4% 
Implied real interest rate 0% 3% 
In Experiments 1 and 2 described below we explore the steady state behavior of 
the mudel economy under, respectively, the low and the high real return regimes. Then, 
in Experiments 3 and 4 we allow for the possibility of switches between both regimes. In 
Experiment 3 the policy regimes are permanent with an average duration of, respectively, 
50 and 10 years and in Experiment 4 the policy regimes are transitory with an average 
12 
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duration of, respectively, 1 year and 1 quarter of a year. In the subsections that follow 
we describe the purpose of the experiments and the calibration choices that are specific 
to each expe~iment, and we report the experimental findings. 
2.1 The steady state experiments: Experiments 1 and 2 
Purpose 
Experiments 1 and 2 have been designed to find out whether the two policy regimes de­
scribed above can be sustained as equilibrium processes in our class of model economies 
under reasonable specifications of the remaining components of government policy. 
Given the role of the government in our model worlds three outcomes are possible: 
first, that there exists no specification of government policy that can sustain those in­
terest rate regimes as part of the equilibrium. Second, that the processes on government 
consumption and on the supplies of currency and T-Bills implied by a policy that in­
cludes those interest rates as part of the equilibrium are outrageously absurd. And, 
third, that the processes on government consumption and on the supplies of currency 
and T-Bills implied by such a policy are reasonable. 
Once this first question is settled, the second purpose of these two experiments is 
to evaluate the steady state effects of switching form the low real interest rate regime 
to the high real interest rate regime. 
Calibration Choices 
i.) Transition probabilities on the exogenous economy-wide process 
Given that Experiments 1 and 2 model two steady state economies, their economy-wide 
processes take only one value, z = 1, with a degenerate transition probability matrix 
given by Pr{ z' = 1 I z = I} = 1. 
ii.) Government Policy 
Experiment 1 explores the steady state behavior of the model economy under the low 
interest rate regime. The policy parameter choices for that regime are () = 0.20, e = 1.05 
and q = 0.995012. These parameter choices imply an average tax rate of 20%, an 
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inflation rate of 4% and a nominal interest rate of 4%. Consequently, the real interest 
rate in this economy is zero. 
Experiment 2 explores the steady state behavior of the model economy under the 
high interest rate regime. The monetary policy parameter choices for that regime are 
e: = 1.05 and q = 0.991288. These parameter choices imply an inflation rate of 4% and 
a nominal interest rate of 7%. Consequently, the real interest rate in this economy is 
3%. Given those components of government policy, the labor income tax rate is then 
calibrated so· that the the steady state value of public consumption is approximately 
0.305: the same value as the one obtained in Experiment 1. The tax rate that renders 
this value is 8 = 0.21682. Therefore, the two steady state experiments have the same 
inflation rates and the same levels of public consumption and they differ in their nominal 
interest rates and labor income tax rates, and in the steady sate government supplies of 
currency and T-Bills. 
Findings 
The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 are reported in Table Ill. The most significant 
of those findings are the following: 
i) In Experiment 1, steady state government consumption is 20.5% of output and T-Bills 
and currency. holdings are, respectively, 28.8% and 12.3%. We therefore conclude that 
when households are liquidity constrained and they hold nominal assets as a substitute 
for insurance against income risks, low real interest rate regimes are feasible under 
reasonable specifications of government policy. 
ii) In Experiment 2, steady state government debt is also 0.20512 (this value now cor­
responds to, approximately, 21.1% of output) and T-Bill and currency holdings are, 
respectively, 0.333 (34.2% of output) and 0.101 (10.4%). We therefore also conclude 
that high real rates of return regimes are also feasible in this class of model economies 
11 The results reported in Table 1 have been renormalized using Experiment 1'5 output as the nor­
malization factor. Hence in the results reported for Experiment 1, variable levels and variable shares 
of output coincide. 
12In this case by construction. 
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Table 2: Steady State Model Aggregates 
PRODUCT ACCOUNT 
Output (y) 1.000 0.972 
Private consumption (c) 0.795 0.767 
Public consumption (g) 0.205 0.205 
LABORINPUT 
Hours (h) 3.079 2.992 
Productivity (y /h) 0.325 0.325 
ASSET HOLDINGS 
Total Real Assets (a) 0.411 0.434 
T-Bills (b) 0.288 0.333 
Currency (m) 0.123 0.101 
GVT.ACCOUNT 
Tax receipts 0.200 0.211 
Int. payments 0.000 0.010 
Gov. Deficita 0.005 0.004 
a Note that the government deficit equals seignorage revenues. 
under reasonable specifications of government policy. 
iii) \Vhen households are liquidity constrained and hold nominal assets as a substitute 
for insurance against income risks, government policies that imply a lower real rate of 
return on those assets are expansionary. From Table 2 we see that reducing real returns 
to government debt while keeping public consumption constant implies an increase in 
output and hours of approximately 3% (2.77 and 2.93% to be precise), and a reduction 
in total asset' holdings of about 5% -this reduction in total assets is brought about by 
a 14% reduction in T-Bill holdings and a 21 % increase in currency holdings. Moreover, 
in this class of model worlds, reducing the real return to government debt while keeping 
public consumption constant increases the government deficit. This result arises from 
the fact that the reduction in income tax revenues resulting from both the lower tax 
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base and the lower income tax rate is greater than the reduced interest payments on 
government debt. 
2.2 Persistent and transitory regime changes: Experiments 3 and 4 
Purpose 
Experiments '3 and 4 have been designed to explore the behavior of our model economy 
when aggregate uncertainty is considered. In these two experiments stochastic switches 
between the low and the high policy regimes are possible. In Experiment 3 both regimes 
are relatively persistent. To mimic the V.S. experience the expected duration of the low 
interest rate regime is 50 years and the expected duration of the high interest rate regime 
is 10 years. In Experiment 4 both policy regimes are relatively transitory. To keep the 
duration ratios invariant, the expected duration of the low interest rate regime is 1 year 
and the expected duration of the high interest rate regime is 1 quarter of a year. The 
purpose of these two experiments is to explore the aggregate effects of permanent policy 
switches that occur after long periods of policy stability. To that purpose we simulate 
a 50 year realization of the low interest rate regime after which there is a policy switch 
to the high interest rate regime. In Figures 1, 2 and 3 we represent the responses of 
respectively aggregate output, consumption and asset holdings after the policy switch 
takes place. 
Calibration Choices 
i.) Transition probabilities on the exogenous economy wide process 
In Experiments 3 and 4 we model policy switches between low and high real inter­
est regimes. Consequently, the aggregate process, z, can, therefore, take two values, 
z E {I, 2}, where state Z = 1 represents the low real rate of return regime, and state 
z = 2 represents the high real rate of return regime. In Experiment 3 the transition 
probabilities on z are chosen to imply expected durations of the high and low real re­
turn regimes of, respectively, 50 and 10 years which correspond to 400 and 80 model 
periods. Given that the expected duration of a state in a Markov chain is the reciprocal 
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of 1 -1r(z, z), where 1r(z, z) is the conditional probability of state z occurring again the 
following period, the transition probability matrix for the economy-wide process that 
satisfies these properties is the following: 
z' = 1 z' = 2 
z=l 0.9975 0.0025 
z=2 0.0125 0.9875 
In Experiment 4 the transition probabilities on z are chosen to imply expected 
durations of the high and low real return regimes of, respectively, 1 year and 1 quarter 
of a year, which correspond to 8 and 2 model periods. The transition probability matrix 
for the economy-wide process that satisfies these properties is the following: 
z' =1 z' = 2 
z=l 0.875 0.125 
z=2 0.5000 0.5000 
ii.) Government Policy 
In Experiment 3 the policy parameter choices for, respectively, the low and the high 
interest rate regimes are the following: c(l) = c(2) = 1.05, e(l) = 0.995012, e(2) = 
0.991288, 0(1) = 0.2 and 0(2) = 0.21682. These choices imply a normalized average 
level of public consumption of 9 = 0.204913 Note that this value for 9 is close to the 
steady state public consumption of Experiments 1 and 2. 
In Experiment 4 the policy parameter choices are the same as those for Experi­
ment 3 for every component of government policy except for the average labor income 
tax rate under the high interest rate regime which are chosen to be 0(2) =0.203. This 
choices imply an average level of public consumption of 9 = 0.2028, again this value is 
close to the those in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. 
Findings 
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 show that permanent policy regime switches that occur after 
long periods of policy stability have significantly larger effects on aggregate output, 
13The averages are taken over 51 independent 40 year samples. 
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consumption and asset holdings when the regimes are perceived as being permanent 
than when they are perceived as being transitory. Specifically, when policy regimes 
are persistent the differences between the asymptotic steady state14 values of aggregate 
output, consumption and asset holdings under the low and the high interest rate regimes 
are, respectively 2.62, 3.44 and 4.55%, and when policy regimes are transitory these 
values are 0.09, 0.06 and 0.03%. 
Figures 1,2,3 and 4 also show that when the policy regimes are perceived as being 
permanent, the effects of permanent policy switches take a few years to be fully realized. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, in the case of aggregate output, it takes almost 2 years 
to close 50% of the gap between the low and the high real interest regime asymptotic 
steady state values. 
Finally, it is also interesting to note that in spite the discreteness 0 both the decision 
rules and the distribution of household-types, the responses of consumption and asset 
holdings are relatively smooth. 
3. Concluding comments 
\Ve find that in our model economies, large quantities of nominal liquid assets are held 
by the households in equilibrium. The size of these holdings is approximately 40 per 
cent of the model economy annual output. Households hold these assets for the insur­
ance substitution services that they provide. Another key finding is that the average 
real return on these assets depends upon monetary policy followed. Government policies 
which lower the real return on these assets drive a wedge between the intertemporal sub­
stitution rate of the household and the gross real return on these assets. In effect, such 
a policy change increases the tax rate on the insurance substitution services provided 
by these assets. 
At the present stage of this research program we abstract from physical capital 
accumulation. But, given that monetary policy determines the tax rate on the insurance 
14By asymptotic steady state values we mean those to which the model economy aggregates would 
converge in the absence of regime changes. 
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substitution services provided by nominally denoted liquid assets and not the tax rate 
on the services of physical capital, we think that there is hope for an extension of this 
model in which there is capital accumulation and in which the rate of return on physical 
capital is significantly higher than liquid nominal assets, as in fact it is. 
We emphasize that at the present stage of this research program it is still premature 
to use these results as a basis for policy discussions. We think, however, that these 
early findings are promising enough to suggest that applied monetary theory should 
not abstract from the precautionary motive for holding liquid assets. We also think 
that this line of inquiry warrants further development. One extension to this theory 
is to introduce banks that pool individual savings and effectively divide up the large 
denomination interest-bearing government debt. Another important extension is to 
allow for banks to intermediate between households with some households borrowing to 
finance the purchase of houses and to finance their small businesses. A final extension 
is to include capital accumulation also in the corporate business sector. 
If this research program is to be successful, the aggregate behavior of the extended 
model must be consistent with the observations that lead to the neoclassical growth 
model, and with the data on aggregate stocks and average returns on the important 
classes of nominal assets held by households. We conjecture that this will probably 
require exploiting household heterogeneity along additional dimensions. 
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Appendix 1 
a. Definitions of the model aggregates
 
For each simulation of the model economies we compute the following real a.ggregates:
 
1. Output 
y = Lw(s,z)n(a,s,z)x(a,s) (16)
a," 
2.	 Employment15 
h = Ln(a,s,z)x(a,s) (17) 
a,s 
3. End-of-period real currency holdings 
m =Lm(a,s,z)x(a,s) (18) 
a,s 
4.	 End-of-period real T-bill holdings 
b = L b(a, s, z)x(a, s) (19) 
a.,S • 
5. Beginning-of-period real asset holdings 
a = Lax(a,s) (20) 
a,s 
6. Private consumption 
a 
c = - +y(l - 0) - m - ,q(z)b	 (21)
e(z) 
7. Interest payments 
(22) 
8. Seignorage revenues 
sgn = m - m_lie (23) 
b. Definitions of the quarterly time series 
We then usec:l the model aggregates to construct quarterly time series for some of the 
basic macroeconomic variables. In so doing, we followed as closely as possible the 
proceJures actually used for V.S. data. Flows are therefore quoted annually. Subscript 
i denotes the i-th subperiod of each quarter. Since the model period was chosen to be 
one-eighth of a year, i =1,2. I computed the following variables: 
15Since the measure of agents is 1, levels and rates are equal 
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1. Output 
Y = 4(Yl + Y2) (24) 
2. Private consumption 
c =4(Cl +C2) (25) 
3. Public consumption 
g=y-c (26) 
4. Hours 
h = 4(h1 + h2 )0,45 (27) 
5. Average labor compensation 
w = y/h (28) 
6. Real currency holdings 
m = (ml + m2)/2 (29) 
7. Real T-bill holdings 
b = (bl + b2)/2 (30) 
8. Real end-of-period asset holdings 
0' = m + b (31) 
9. Nominal interest rate 
i = 4( -log ql -log q2) (32) 
10. Inflation rate 
pip = 4(logPHl.1 -logpt,d (33) 
11. Real interest rate 
r = i - pip (34) 
12. Tax revenues 
e = By (35) 
13. Interest payments 
int = 4(int l + int 2 ) (36) 
14. Government Deficit 
de! = 9 + int ­ e = sgn (37) 
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Appendix 2 
Let a' = f(a,s) be the end-of-period optimal asset holdings expressed as & function of 
beginning-of-period assets, a, and of the realization of the household-specific productiv-
ity shock, s. These functions for s = 1,2 for the economy described in Experiment 2 
are plotted in Figures 5 and 6. The ergodicity of the equilibrium Markov chain follows 
immediately from the following two facts: i) that the transition proba.bilities, 1r(s' Is) 
are all positive, and ii) that a' = f(a,2) lies uniformly below the 45 degree line. These 
two facts imply that there is a positive probability of reaching asset holdings a = 0 in 
a finite number of periods, and, therefore, that state (a = 0,8 = 1,2) is recurrent and 
that the equilibrium Markov chain is ergodic. 
The ergodic set for this economy is E = {(a, s) : a < 3.59}. This result can be 
seen from the following argument. The decision rule a' = f(a,l) is the largest of the 
two and it crosses the 45 degree line from above at a = 3.59. Given fa.ct i) there is a 
positive probability of reaching a = 3.59 from any a < 3.59 in a finite number of periods. 
Further, if a > 3.59 then no point with a > 3.59 can be reached with positive probability. 
Hence the set T = {(a, s) : a > 3.59} is transient and the set E = {(a,s) : a < 3.59} is 
ergodic. This argument is very similar to the one offered in the Appendix of imrohoroglu 
(1989). 
Figure 5: Decision Rules for Exp 2 (s=1) Figure 6: Decision Rules for E)(p 2 (s=2) 
e' 5 e' 5 / 
./ 
./
,
,
4 4 / 
./ 
/ 
/ 
3 3 , ./ 
, / 
2 2 / " /
/ 
1 1 /
" 
./ 
/ 
.1/ " 
0 0 
1 .0 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 
a 8 
.-
24 
--_.._---------------------------
